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INTRODUCTION
The factors which contributed to the failure of welfare reforms
and welfare programs of the past are well documented. After two decades
of various welfare reforn~ proposalsit is clear that the welfare reforms
and welfare programs of the past have fallen short of our major welfare
reform goals. There may be several reasons for this assessment includ
ing high expectations, the conflicting nature of our welfare reform
goals and inadequate funding. However, some of the problems of the
current system are glaring. They include the following:
1. The present system provides inadequate coverage for both
the working poor and the poor who are unable to work.
2. The present system is plagued by administrative ineffi
ciency.
3. Twenty-five million people are still below the poverty
level.
4. The cost of the present system has become a burden to state
and local governmentsJ
In recent years incremental and comprehensive reforms have been
advanced to improve the efficacy and efficiency of the welfare system.
Comprehensive reforms such as work - welfare approaches, and comprehen
sive cash assis Lance approaches (which includes guaraliLeed incomes)
have gained some support in recent years. The work-welfare approaches
focus on the often neglected demand side of the labor market and the
~ Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Welfare
Reform Legislation, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Public Assist
ance and Unemployment Compensation on H.R. 4321, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1979, p. 8.
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comprehensive cash assistance approaches focus on providing a basic
income support level and an equitable distribution of benefits. Both
types of welfare reform try to deal effectively with the tradeoffs that
are involved in meeting our welfare reform goals. Some of the proposed
welfare reforms could offer some improvements to the efficacy and
efficiency of the welfare system.
This thesis explores the following:
The welfare system and an assessment of it in terms of our
major welfare reform goals.
- The two major types of welfare reform approaches - the
work welfare approaches that focus on the demand side of
the labor market and the comprehensive cash assistance
approaches that focus on a basic income support level.
- The effect of income guarantees on work - some of the
potential economic consequences.
- An assessment of the 1977 Carter administration’s program
for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) an unsuccessful welfare
reform proposal that incorporated both a demand side of
the labor market focus (a guaranteed jobs program) and a
comprehensive cash assistance approach for those who were
unable to work.
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE
The Welfare Reform Goals
The literature on welfare reform consists of a myriad of pro
posals and/or approaches and analyses of their effects. In addition,
the problems of the welfare system and the resultant effects are often
analyzed. The fundamental goals of welfare reform are based realistic
ally on problems of the welfare system.
The perceived problem areas that make up the ‘welfare mess’ and
how welfare reform should proceed are dependent on the goals
established for the welfare system. Though there is not com
plete agreement on priorities, goals, and strategies, several
goals are often mentioned as desirable.
The welfare reform goals most often cited are:
1. Adequacy (an adequate level of support that will allow
families to subsist);
2. Horizontal Equity (recipients in corresponding situations
should receive corresponding benefits);
3. Vertical Equity (the more one earns, the more he or she
keeps; the most needy are to receive the most benefits);
4. Work Incentives (those able to work are effectively
motivated to do so);
5. Family Stability Incentives (family structure should only
be minimally affected by welfare programs);
6. Administrative Efficiency (the operation of the system
should be done at the lowest cost); and
7. Target Efficiency (benefits should go to those most in
need).
In the real world, the basic goals must be compromised to
varying extents to create welfare reform plans that are
3
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integrated* and practical given the conflicting character
of these goals.1
The concept of adequacy is built on the idea that the poor re
ceive some minimum level of benefits and/or income that is adequate to
live on from an income-tested transfer system. Ideally, this “income
tested transfer system should work in conjunction with employment and
social insurance systems.”2 The concept of adequacy is not easily mea
sured and is a topic of debate. The increasing difficulty of evaluating
the concept of adequacy can be based on two factors. First, there is no
consensus as to how adequacy should be defined, and second, measurement
of adequacy has been complicated by the advent of the numerous in-kind
3progranis.
The major issue is whether an absolute or a relative definition
of adequacy is appropriate. An absolute definition treats adequacy as
that level of income required to provide an individual or family the
bare minimum food, clothing, shelter, and related services necessary to
avoid severe deprivation. A relative definition views poverty in terms
of a comparison between income available to the less well off and that
available to others in the society.4
*The meaning of the word integrated as used in this discussion
is to unite the various and interrelated programs of the welfare system
into effective systems.
‘Michael C. Barth, George J. Carcagno, and John L. Palmer,
Toward an Effective Income Support System: Problems, Prospects, and
Choices (Madison: Institute for Research on Poverty, University of
Wisconsin Press, 1974), pp. 40-42.
2lbid
3Lester Salmon, Welfare: The Elusive Consensus (New York:
Praeger Publishing, 1978), p. 31.
4lbid.
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The concept of target efficiency advocates that benefits should
be directed to the most “needy.”1 “Within a given budget constraint,
greater benefits should be transferred to those of lower incomes.”2
Categorization of recipients is used to provide target efficiency since
categorization is supposed to assure that benefits of a given program
are received by the most needy groups of people to the greatest extent
possible. This approach excludes certain groups according to the pro
grams’ standards.3 The categorical nature of the need-tested welfare
programs requires that recipients not only be needy but additionally
requires that recipients are in a particular demographic category such
as aged, disabled, blind, or in a family with dependent children headed
by a woman or in some states an unemployed male. Thus, if individuals
or families do not fall in these categories they will be excluded.
The most needy are individuals and families with low incomes, especially
those groups having a higher than average incidence of poverty such as
blacks, families with children, and the aged.
The concept of administrative efficiency says a system should
achieve its goals at a minimum cost. Ideally, simplicity should be
characteristic of the system’s operation for both administrator and re
cipient. Integration and coordination should be attained with multiple
programs to control costs and to make the system manageable. Adminis
trative efficiency is difficult to obtain when there is a lack of
1”Needy” is used throughout this paper to mean families or in
dividuals with incomes below the poverty level, adjusted for inflation.
In 1981 that level was $8,414 for a family of four.
2Barth, Carcagno, and Palmer, Toward an Effective Income




The equity concept or issue of fairness is two interrelated
issues: horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity
states that people in similar circumstances should receive similar
benefits.2 Categorization withits accompanying shortcomings is used
to determine similar circumstances. Differing program rules and wide
interstate differentials lead to inequities. The wide interstate dif
ferentials are caused by each individual state determining benefit
levels, eligibility, and other program criteria. As a consequence of
such wide administrative discretion, differences in state benefit
levels cannot be explained by income differences or cost of living
differences when states are compared. Also, gaps in the categorization
process can lead to some families or individuals being eligible to re
ceive assistance while other families or individuals are ineligible to
receive assistance even though their situations are similar.3 Another
cause of inequity is a notch, a point in the public assistance benefit
scale where one additional dollar of earnings makes a recipient ineli
gible for other programs.
Vertical equity stresses that families and/or individuals “who
earn more income should receive more total income.”4 Concurrently,
those who need the most assistance should receive the most assistance.





delibitating effect of the welfare system on the functioning of the
labor market. The idea that the welfare recipient should not be better
off than the working poor is one basis of the political controversy of
vertical equity.’
The concept of work incentives states that individuals who are
employable should have strong motivation to work. The welfare system
should not promote dependency on its assistance. Higher disposable
income should reward those who work and earn more. The notches and
high cumulative benefit reduction rates in the present welfare system
have a negative effect on work incentives.2
The idea of family stability incentives is an important con
cept. It is desirable that a system should keep to minimum incen
tives that would lead to the break up of the family. The effect of
this system of programs on children, women, female-headed families,
working fathers, the aged, etc. has been a cause of some concern and
some intensive research. The fact that some families would be better
off in terms of their eligibility for welfare benefits if the parents
were separated or divorced has been a major concern. A serious problem
that can accompany the categorical nature of the programs is that peo
ple may be encouraged to make themselves part of the target group to
receive greater benefits3 via separation or divorce.
1Salamon, Welfare: The Elusive Concensus, pp. 46-47.
2Barth, Carcagno, Palmer, Toward An Effective Income Support
System: Problems, Prospects, and Choices, pp. 40-42.
3lbid.
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Incremental and Comprehensive Reforms
The essential issue is how to implement these basic welfare
reform goals:
1. What approaches should be utilized and why?
2. What advantages and disadvantages do these approaches have?
3. What are the trade-offs of these approaches?
In recent years, there have been two basic types of approaches
advanced, the incremental change approach and the comprehensive re
structuring approach. Discussion and analyses of these approaches and
plans are based on how well these plans work toward reaching welfare
reform goals as well as how feasible they are in a given political cli
mate with philosophical and budgetary restraints. Important or key
features are the cost of the plan, the effectiveness of work incentives
in the plan, and the level of assistance for recipients in the plan.
The incremental change approach entails step by step modifica
tions of the system to eradicate its problems. The form of the welfare
system would remain intact and thus allow for only categorical changes.
The financial responsibility for the programs would remain with state,
federal, and local governments.’ In the past, the welfare system has
been developed by the incremental approach and these revisions have in
creased and broadened the benefits but have distributed them unevenly.2
1U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Welfare
Reform: Issues, Objectives and Approaches, Congressional Budget Office
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1977), p. 32.’
2Leonard J. Hausman, Barry L. Friedman, “Welfare in Retreat: A
Dilemma for the Federal System,” Public Policy, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter
1977), pp. 25-48.
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The cited advantages of this approach are its political feasibility and
its relative low cost when compared with the other approaches. Disad
vantages of this approach are that this type of change does nothing
to improve the system’s faulty structure and that the welfare recipi
ents and the public’s dislike for the system will remain. Advocates of
comprehensive restructuring assert that piecemeal reforms are being
oversold as a strategy.1 However, many economists and social theorists
feel that after reviewing the current difficulties associates with wel
fare reform policy, the incremental approach is the only realistic
approach. They think that comprehensive restructuring is not only
politically impossible, it is unnecessary and undesirable.2
Advocates of a comprehensive restructuring approach have ad
vanced a number of possible approaches to meet many of the welfare
reform goals. These include the work-welfare, multi-track approaches
for those who are able to work and a comprehensive cash assistance
approach for those who cannot work. The latter entails the use of a
single cash payment system that would replace many of the current pro
grams. Each one of these types of approaches have trade-offs to be
considered. Advocates of sweeping change have proposed widely diver
gent plans.
Work-welfare plans to provide public service employment for
those who are able to work but not able to secure the needed
1Laurence J. Lynn, Jr. and Mark D. Worthington, “Incremental
Welfare Reform: A Strategy Whose Time has Passed,” Public Policy,
Vol. 25, No. 1, Winter, 1977, pp. 49-80.
2Frederick Doolittle, Frank Levy, Michael Wiseman, “The Mirage
of Welfare Reform,” Public Interest, Vol. 47, Spring 1977, pp. 62-87.
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employment with the private sector. Concurrently, the work-welfare
approaches provide training and placement services for those who can
work to better enable them to be absorbed into the private sector.
Advantages of these approaches are that taxpayers are more willing to
reward work than to provide welfare and that the government provides
work opportunities. Disadvantages are that job creation is costly
and no mechanisms or strategies have been developed to create a large
number of public service jobs.1
Guaranteed Incomes
Proponents of comprehensive welfare reform have advanced many
guaranteed income plans over the years. Guaranteed income plans advo
cate the government providing a minimum level of income for those who
are unable to earn enough by working. These plans would increase
welfare payments for millions of Americans and increase the cost of
the welfare system. Advocates of this type of plan hope that a single
system of cash benefits would eliminate the administrative complexity
of the existing system.2
To be feasible, a guaranteed income must meet three basic
criteria: (1) the cost of the plan must be reasonable, (2) the plan
should have effective work incentives, and (3) the plan should provide
an adequate level of support. Ideally, these three conditions should
be achieved simulLaneously aiidhei~ein lies a Inajol’ problem. Benefit
levels, the marginal rate of taxation, and overall program costs are
1U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Welfare
Reform: Issues, Objectives and Approaches, pp. 38-44.
2James Tobin, “The Case for an Income Guarantee,” The Public
Interest, No. 4, Summer 1966, PP. .34-35.
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tightly interwoven factors, to adjust one of these factors you must ad
just the others.’ Thus, meeting the basic criteria of reasonable cost,
adequate levels of support, and effective work incentives simultaneous.
ly is difficult to achieve.
The marginal tax rates of a guaranteed income plan provide the
work incentives of the plan. The marginal tax rate is based on the
schedule of reduction in benefit payments as a welfare recipient’s in
come increases. This tax has the same effect as normal taxes on the
incentive to work. A high marginal tax rate placed on welfare recipi
ents would negate the financial motivation for working. Some welfare
experts assert that it is impossible to have low welfare tax rates and
give substantial benefits to the working poor while maintaining a low
cost. Obtaining any two objectives conflicts with a third.2
The Effect of Income Guarantees on Work
The research on the effects of guaranteed income plans on work
is inconclusive. The results of the most well known guaranteed income
experiment, the New Jersey Income Maintenance Experiment, indicated
that the work effort of employed males was only marginally affected by
the availability of an income guarantee regardless of the tax rates.3
Other studies conclude that guaranteed income plans produce a work re
duction effect among low income workers. Some studies estimated a
1lbid., pp. 37 and 39.
2Leonard J. Hausman, “Cumulative Tax Rates in Alternative In
come Maintenance Systems,” in Irene Lurie (editor), Integrating Income
Maintenance Progranis (New York: Academic Press, 1975), p. 40.
3Joseph A. Pechman and P. Michael Timpane, Eds., Work Incen
tives and Income Guarantees: The New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experi
ment (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975).
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work reduction effect of 50 percent.1
Program for Better Jobs and Income
The 1977 Carter administration proposal called the Program for
Better Jobs and Income utilized both a comprehensive assistance approach
and a guaranteed jobs approach to help those who could not work and
those who could. It proposed cashing out AFDC, SSI, and food stamp bene
fits and combining these with a jobs program. This proposal, which was
not passed by Congress, provided improvements such as a national minimum
benefit level and administrative improvements. Some of the proposal’s
perceived shortcomings were its relatively high cost, its administrative
complexity, and its level of work disincentives.2
Chapter two provides an overview of the system of welfare pro-
grains and an assessment of the welfare system in terms of the major
welfare reform goals. A description of the various programs’ functions
and costs is provided. An assessment of the welfare system in terms
of adequacy, equity, administrative efficiency, target efficiency, work
incentives, and cost is also provided. This assessment provides in
sight into the magnitude of the welfare system’s problems.
Chapter three examines the two major welfare reform approaches,
the incremental change approach and the comprehensive restructuring
approach. This chapter includes an assessment of these approaches and
the work-welfare approaches, coniprelieiisi ye cash assistance approaches,
1David H. Greenburg and Marvin Kosters, “Income Guarantees and
the Working Poor,” in Glen G. Cain and Harold W. Watts, Eds. Income
Maintenance and Labor Supply: Econometric Studies (Chicago: Rand
McNally Publishers, 1973), p. 74.
2Sheldon Danziger and Robert Plotnik, “Can ‘Welfare Reform’
Eliminate Poverty?,” Discussion Paper, No. 517-78, Institute for Re
search on Poverty (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, August
1978).
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and the multi-track approach. This chapter also closely examines the
guaranteed income approach.
Chapter four examines the effect that income guarantees have
on the work effort of the recipients. It also explores some potential
economic consequences of income guarantees. Also, this chapter re
views three types of studies and some of their findings on the effect
that income guarantees have on work. The chapter also explores the
economic theory of work and leisure.
Chapter five examines the 1977 Carter administration proposal
Program for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI). This chapter illustrates
how some welfare reform proposals fail to effectively deal with the
trade-offs involved with welfare reform. An assessment of the PBJI in
terms of the welfare reform goals is also included. Further, the
chapter provides insight into the difficulties of welfare reform.
Chapter six is a summary of findings and recommendations. The
findings and recommendations of this study provide an analysis of the
problems of the welfare system and welfare reform approaches to improve
it. This study also should provide insight into the difficulties of
welfare reform.
CHAPTER II
AN ASSESSMENT OF ThE WELFARE SYSTEM
The welfare system was designed to address the survival prob
lems of the low income population and, though it has succeeded in
helping many people, welfare experts think that the welfare system has
major problems. The welfare system consists of programsthat offer cash
assistance including: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
which offers support to needy families with children; Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) which offers assistance to needy people who are
aged, blind, and disabled; The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) which
gives aid through a tax break to low income workers; and The General
Assistance program (GA) which is a set of state programs that provide
assistance to needy persons who are ineligible for the federal programs.
In-kind benefits which consist of goods and services for the needy are
currently available through the Food Stamp program, Medicaid, the Child
Nutrition program, and housing assistance programs.1
The Cash Assistance Programs
AFDC
AFDC and its related programs offer cash assistance to low in
come female-headed families with dependent children and to families
1U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Welfare
Reform: Issues, Objectives and Approaches, p. 1.
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where the father is unemployed, disabled or incapacitated (twenty-six
states have an unemployed parent program (AFDC-UP) which include the
male-headed households). The federal outlays for this program in fis
cal year 1981, as proposed by the Carter Administration, would
have been $7.8 billion. Nearly eleven million people receive AFDC bene
fits.1 AFDC does not have a national minimum or basic needs standard.
Eligibility for AFDC is determined by the individual states and thus
benefits vary widely from state to state. Financial responsibility for
the program is divided among federal, state, and local governments. In
recent years, the states and localities have assumed about 45 per
cent of the cost while the federal government has assumed about 55
percent of the cost of this program.2
SSI
The SSI program provides cash assistance to needy aged, blind
or disabled individuals. Some states supplement the basic federal
grant with state payments. The federal outlays for this program in
fiscal year 1981, as proposed by the Carter Administration, were $7.3
billion. This program has automatic cost of living increases in bene
fit levels and has 4.2 million recipients.3 In recent years, benefit
levels for SSI recipients have reached 73 and 83 percent of the
1U.S. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget of the United
States, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office),
pp. 260-272.
2US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Welfare
Reform: Issues, Objectives and Approaches, p. 5.
3U.S. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget of the United
States, Fiscal Year 1981, pp. 260-272.
poverty threshold for one and two member families, respectively.1
El TC
EITC aids low income workers by providing a tax credit that re
duces the amount of income tax they are required to pay. If the credit
amounts to more than the taxes owed, the workers get the amount of the
difference rebated to them. In 1979, the credit was 10 percent of the
first $5,000 of income and reduced at a rate of 1.25 percent of each
$110 earned above $6,000 of income.2 The cost of this proposal as pro
posed by the Carter administration was $1.9 billion in fiscal year l98l.~
General Assistance (GA)
General Assistance is provided by states to aid needy persons
who are ineligible for the federal programs. These programs are entire
ly financed by state and local governments in thirty-three states.
Benefit levels provided vary widely from state to state and are limited
in nature.4 In fiscal year 1981 the cost of these programs to the
5
states will be over $1.1 billion.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Welfare
Reform: Issues, Objectives and Approaches, p. 6.
Congressional Budget Office, The Budget of the United
States, Fiscal Year 1981, p. 258.
3lbid., pp. 260-272.
4Vee Burke, Federal and State-Local Expenditures for Income
Transfers to Persons with Limited Income, Fiscal Years, 1975 and 1976
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Offices, 1976), p. 11.
5 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Program for
Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1978), p. 20.
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In-Kind Programs
The Food Stamp Program
The Food Stamp Program helps needy families purchase food by
providing a monthly allotment of coupons that can be exchanged for food.
These monthly allotments of coupons are adjusted twice a year for
changes in food prices. The amount of the monthly allotment received
is determined by earned income and household size. A profile of food
stamp recipients in 1976 indicated that a majority of the recipients
had incomes below the poverty level, some 68 percent of the households
were headed by females and 17 percent of the participating households
had one or more member over age sixty-four.1 In fiscal year 1981, the
cost of the program, as proposed by the Carter administration, would
have been $9.7 billion. This program had 20.4 million recipients in
fiscal year 1981.2 The federal government and the state governments
equally share all of the administrative costs.
The School Lunch and Other
Nutrition Programs
The school lunch and other nutrition programs provide indirect
subsidies to needy and non-needy children through food assistance pro
grams. There are fifteen separate federal programs that assist states
in feeding children and other needy persons. Some of these programs
are the National School Lunch program, the School Breakfast program,
the Summer Feeding program, the Child Care program, and the Women,
1U.S. Congressional Office, The Budget of the United States,
Fiscal Year 1980, p. 262.
2US Congressional Office, The Budget of the United States,
Fiscal Year 1981, pp. 260-272.
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Infants, and Children program (WIC). The WIC program is a special
feeding program for women, infants, and children. In fiscal year 1981,
over twenty-five million participants would have received $3.6 billion
in subsidies, as proposed by the Carter administration for the school
lunch and other nutrition programs. Also, over two million recipients
would have received $903 million in benefits from the WIC program as
proposed by the Carter administration in fiscal 1981,1
Housing Assistance Programs
Housing assistance provided by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) offers economic assistance to support housing.
Emphasis is on rental housing assistance for low income families and
individuals. In fiscal year 1981 these programs would have cost $6.6
billion as proposed by the Carter administration. Also, HUD provided
subsidies for subsidized housing which would have cost $914 million as
proposed by the Carter Administration. Two major HUD rental housing
programs are lower income rental assistance (Section 8) and public
housing. The basic objective of these programs is to improve housing
conditions for low income families and individuals. As of 1981, 1.1
million families occupied public housing and 1.3 million families re
ceived assistance from the Section 8 program.2
The Medicaid Program
The Medicaid program provides health care at little or no cost




would have financed care for twenty-three million people as proposed
by the Carter administration. The funding for this program is divided
among federal, state, and local governments. The states have responsi
bility for the administration of the program.1
The Need for Welfare Reform
An assessment of the welfare system is necessary to evaluate
the efficacy and efficiency of the system. This assessment of the wel
fare system will focus on the conceptual issues of adequacy, horizontal
and vertical equity, target efficiency, work incentives, administrative
efficiency, and cost. From this assessment we can determine how well
the welfare system achieves its objectives. It is from this process
that welfare reform proposals can be designed or improvements can be
made to minimize waste and errors.
Adequacy
A comprehensive assessment of the distribution of income in the
United States is provided by the Census Bureau’s yearly analysis of the
poverty population. According to the Census Bureau, in 1978, 24.5
million persons were below the poverty level, some 11.4 percent of the
total U.S. population. The present system of cash assistance not
withstanding, many remain below the poverty level. White families had
a much lower rate of poverty (6.9 percent) than black families (27.5
percent). Groups having a higher than average incidence of poverty are
id.
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blacks, families with children, and the aged.1
The Persistence of Poverty
The economic and social conditions of a country are major de
terminants of the extent of poverty experienced by citizens. There
were several significant developments that affected the level of
poverty in the United States in the past decade. One such development
was a significant reduction in real economic growth. The recession of
1973/74 and the accompanying unemployment increased the incidence of
poverty and negated, somewhat, the effectiveness of the income transfer
programs. It is clear, however, that the impact of the recession and
the ensuing unemployment would have been more severe without the bene
fits provided by the income transfer programs.2
Changes in family compositionwere another important development.
The proportion of female headed families in the population increased.
When compared to other families female-headed families have a higher
incidence of poverty. In 1977, 31.7 percent of all female-headed fami
lies were in poverty compared to 5.5 percent of other families.3
1U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Money,
Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States,
Population Report Series, Vol. 1, 1978, p. 1.
2Robert D. Plotnick and Felicity Skidmore, Progress Against
Poverty Institute for Research on Poverty, (University of Wisconsin
Press, 1975), pp. 117—118.
3Beverly L. Johnson, “Women Who Head Families: Their Numbers
Rise, Income Lags.t’ Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 101, No. 2, February
1978, pp. 32-37.
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The low benefit levels of the welfare programs are also a fac
tor in the persistence of poverty. An assessment of average monthly
benefit levels in major cash assistance programs in a 1976 study indi
cated that between 1965 and 1975 social security was the only program
1whose average benefit level rose consistently. This explains why
the proportion of the aged poverty population declined between 1965
and 1975. However, some programs like AFDC had a different experi
ence. In the AFDC program, the average benefits increased significant
ly between 1965 and 1970 and then leveled off or declined in constant
dollar terms between 1970 and 1975.2 This could explain why the pro
portion of female headed families in poverty increased despite the
availability of a cash assistance program.
Leaks and Gaps in the Programs
The presence of gaps and leaks in the structure of the welfare
programs are often cited as factors that explain the persistence of
poverty.3 Most of these problems are caused by the categorical nature
of the programs. Categories used to identify segments of the needy
population such as the blind, disabled, and aged, exclude more people
than they include creating huge gaps in coverage. This fault limits
the assistance offered to segments of the poor population.
1U.S. Department of Commerce, Social Security Bulletin, 39,
No. 7 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), July 1976.
2Ib•d
3Barth, Carcagno, and Palmer, Toward an Effective Income
Support System: Problems, Prospects and Choices, pp. 40-42.
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The impact of the gaps and leaks as well as variations in bene
fits mitigate the effectiveness of the welfare system in raising the
poor above the poverty level. A 1976 study indicated that only 44 per
cent of all pretransfer poor families rose above the poverty level as a
result of benefits from the major income transfer programs. In addi
tion, the public assistance category of the major income transfer pro
1
grams aided only 5 percent of the poor in getting out of poverty.
Inequity
Horizontal Inequities in Cash Assistance Programs. Another
major problem of the welfare system is the difficulty it has been hav
ing in addressing itself to the issue of basic fairness or equity. This
is evidenced by the disparities faced by different segments of the poor
population that are called horizontal inequities. Horizontal inequi
ties are a pervasive problem in the welfare system. The combination
of the categorical needs standards and the broad discretion left to
states produces these inequities.2
In particular, the eligibility standards of the need-tested
programs have allowed large sections of the needy population, es
pecially the working poor, to be excluded from federal cash assistance
subsidies. Even though state general assistance programs are available
for the poor who are ineligible for the federal programs, the general
assistance programs provide only limited benefits and coverage.3 An
other illustration of the horizontal inequities in the system are the
1Plotnick and Skidmore, Progress Against Poverty, p. 147.
2U5 Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Handbook of Public




state variations in benefits and coverage. In the AFDC program, for
example, the individual states are allowed to determine the benefit
levels, eligibility, and other program criteria. Thus, there are wide
variations in benefits, eligibility, and other program criteria from
one state to another. A 1975 study by the Joint Economic Committee of
Congress indicated that the differences in state benefit levels cannot
be explained by income differences or cost of living differences when
states were compared. For example, while Louisiana paid a maximum of
$122 to an AFDC family in 1974, neighboring Mississippi, with per capita
income three-fourths as high as Louisiana, was paying only half as much;
nearby Oklahoma, with per capita income only 10 percent higher than
Louisiana, provided twice as much.1
Horizontal Inequities in the In-Kind Benefit Programs. Hori
zontal inequities are also found in the in-kind benefits program. Even
though some programs such as the Food Stamp program have reduced horizon
tal inequities by providing additional benefits and coverage, other in-
kind benefits programs have added to the problem. Mainly, participation
in many of the in-kind benefits programs required participation in the
categorical programs.2 For example, AFDC recipients with incomes above
poverty level (as a result of combined AFDC payments and Medicaid) •can
receive food stamps, whereas those with similar incomes from sources
other than AFDC cannot. In addition, AFDC recipients, regardless of
the presence of other post transfer income, are automatically eligible
llbid
2US Department of Agriculture, Food, and Nutrition Survey,
National Participation and Costs Impacts of Proposed Changes in Food
Stamp Programs (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976).
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for Medicaid while similarly situated non-AFDC families may not be.:l
Thus, pre-existing inequities are increased by the in-kind benefits
programs. In addition to these inequities, the limitations inherent
in the in-kind benefits program such as funding limitations and dis
parities in participation increase the problem.
Vertical Inequities. The issue of vertical inequity focuses
on the advantages the welfare system sometimes provides for the poor
versus the non-poor. A major concern that arises when addressing the
issue of vertical inequity is that the welfare system may be enabling
welfare recipients to live better than the working poor. One example
of this concern is the effects of the provision that allows AFDC re
cipients to deduct work expenses from their income. Suppose there are
two workers who earn $5,300 per year on the same job and one of them
was on AFDC and one was not. If the worker on AFDC claimed work re
lated expenses (taxes, child care, etc.) of $1,000, then she/he could
end up with $2,173 more than the non-AFDC worker. The bonus of $2,173
includes the amount of AFDC benefits entitled after work expenses and
the additional flat $30 per month plus one-third of all remaining earn
ings from income before calculating the AFDC benefits.2
Target Efficiency. Target efficiency is the concept based on
the idea that benefits should be directed to the most needy. In the wel
fare system, categorization is used to target benefits to the most needy
and this causes some problems. The problem is that categorization has
1lbid.
2 Salamon, Welfare: The Elusive Consensus, p. 47.
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excluded large portions of the needy population. Thus, leaks of bene
fits to the non-poor and the exclusion of portions of the needy popula
tion, which include the aged, families with children, the working poor,
and blacks, are major problems.1
Work Incentives and Marginal Tax Rates
Work incentives are a major issue in the welfare system. The
goal of the public assistance programs is to avoid causing any negative
impact on the welfare recipients’ incentive to work. The AFDC program,
for example, was fitted with a work incentives provision in 1967. This
provision permitted the states to deduct work expenses and $30 plus one-
third of the remaining income when computing benefits of recipients.2
Marginal Tax Rates. The efforts to provide work incentives in
the welfare system have been somewhat mitigated by another factor, the
cumulative marginal tax rates of the programs.3 The marginal tax rates
are based on the schedule of reduction in benefit payments as a welfare
recipient’s earned income increases. This tax has the same effect as
normal taxes on the incentive to work, the higher the tax the less the
motivation to work. Marginal tax rates differ from notches. With a
notch, one additional dollar of income can make a person ineligible for
other programs but in the case of marginal tax rates an additional
dollar in income results in only a partial reduction in benefits. The
size of that reduction in relation to the increase in income is the
‘Ibid., p. 38.
2lbid., p. 52.
3u.s. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Welfare in the




In many instances, marginal tax rates of one program are added
to the marginal tax rate of other programs in their effect on welfare
recipients. The in-kind benefit programs that supplement AFDC have
their own marginal tax rates, thus these tax rates combine with the
marginal tax rates of the AFDC program and result in a greater loss in
benefits. For example, while the AFDC program taxes net earnings at a
67 percent rate (benefits decline $2 for every $3 in earnings in excess
of expenses and $30 per month), if an AFDC recipient participates in the
Food Stamp program, they are taxed an additional 30 cents per dollar)
In a study of operations in 100 areas, the Joint Economic Committee con
cluded that in practice it was possible that the income remaining after
work expenses and benefit reductions for employed AFDC and food stamp
recipients can average as little as 20 cents per dollar earned.2
A Series of Notch Problems
The welfare system’s benefit scales have a series of problems
called notches that also mitigate efforts to provide work incentives.
A notch is a point in the public assistance benefit scale where one
additional dollar of earnings makes a recipient ineligible for other
programs. Ideally, programs like AFDC and food stamps have benefit
levels that gradually decrease thus avoiding this problem. However,
what happens in some programs like Medicaid is that an additional dol




in medical care.1 Notch problems not only affect AFDC recipients, but
many others not on cash assistance.
Impact of Work Disincentives. Most analysts conclude that work
disincentives such as cumulative marginal tax rates and notches in bene
fit scales do have a negative work effect on welfare recipients. How
ever, this conclusion is not considered to be definitive2 as the effects
of welfare on work is still being studied. Some experts think that the
strength of a negative work effect caused by disincentives is subject to
factors such as age, sex, and marital status. Some research indicates
that the negative work effect is small for working age males but some
what stronger for married women, female family heads, and older men.3
Administrative Complexities of the Welfare
System
Complexity. The concept of administrative efficiency is the
idea that a system should achieve its goals at a minimum cost. This
goal is important to a vital welfare system. However, the welfare sys
tem is characterized by overlapping programs, financial costliness, and
undue complexity. A major cause of the system’s complexity is the use
of both demographic (categorical) and needs-tested standards for estab
lishing eligibility. For example, in addition to demonstrating finan
cial need for AFDC, an applicant must prove that he/she is a relative,
that the child lives with him/her, and that the parent is absent from
home. In addition, every potential source of income is explored
‘Salamon, Welfare: The Elusive Consensus, p. 50.
2lrwin Garfinkel, “Income Transfer Programs and Work Effort: A
Review,” in U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, Studies in Public
Welfare Papers, No. 13, 93rd Cong. 2d sess., 1974, pp. 1-32.
3lbid.
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including earnings, gifts, rent, child support, and social security)
The level of benefits and eligibility for assistance can be
affected by how income is defined.
The definition of countable income affects program costs both
directly by affecting the number of recipients and the amount
of benefits they receive and indirectly by necessitating in
creased administrative complexity. Under a broad definition
of income, countable income would include all earned and un
earned income as well as public and private transfer benefits.
Some experts feel that a broad definition of income would
minimize program eligibility and costs.
In some welfare programs certain expenses may be deducted from
income to achieve increased equity or to provide financial
incentives. For example, AFDC allows child care and work de
ductions. The food stamp program allows deductions for medical
and shelter expenses.2
Asset tests (assets are cash, savings, checking accounts, and
other resources (a car or home) that can be converted to cash for cur
rent consumption) establish limits on the amount of assets a recipient
may have and remain eligible for benefits. Various welfare programs
allow different assets to be excluded from the assets test.
For example, in the SSI program a limit is placed on the
amount of cash a recipient may have on hand. In 1978 under
the SSI program a recipient could exclude the value of house
hold goods and personal effects up to $1,500, exclude the
value of an automobile up to $1,200, and exclude entirely
the value of an owner-occupied home.3
Lines of Authority. An additional problem is that the lines
of authority of the system are not clearly demarcated among federal,
state, and local agencies. Often, for the states, the administrative
authority at the federal level becomes an additional complication. The
‘Salamon, Welfare: The Elusive Consensus, p. 53.
2Welfare Reform: Issues Objectives and Approaches, pp. 49-50.
3lbid.
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states often must try to integrate federal regulatory changes with on
going state administrative practices. For example, when federal rules
on the treatment of income of stepfathers in AFDC changed, state social
service departments had to revise their data intake forms accordingly.
Many states point out that there can be a large number of federal
changes in a year.1
Procedures and Structures. Other features that add to the ad
ministrative burden are: separate programs have both separate eligi
bility procedures and definitions of income; elaborate certification
procedures must be repeated many times; and the programs have separate
administrative structures.2 AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid eligibility,
for example, are all determined by different procedures. Also, the
definitions of income differ among these programs. For example, AFDC
exempts the income of full and part-time students who are not full-time
employees (as well as deducts one-third of all earnings above $30 a
month plus work expenses). However, a program like the Food Stamp pro
gram does not differentiate between full and part-time students and
provides deductions that include medical expenses and shelter costs in
excess of 30 percent of nonexempt income.3
The elaborate certification procedures contribute to the admin
istrative burden because of the dynamic nature of the welfare population.
For example, most AFDC recipients are participants for less than two
years at a time. The situations of recipients can change even in this
llbid
d.
3u.s. Congress, Committee on Ways and Means, Public Welfare
Study for the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, 92nd Cong., 1st sess.
1975, pp. 83-86.
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period of time. Consequently, eligibility must be determined repeatedly.
Elaborate recertification procedures are necessary, entailing complete
affidavits and verifications.1
The fact that separate administrative structures are designed
for separate programs adds to administrative complexity. For example,
aged food stamp recipients must locate not just the SSI intake office,
but the food stamp office as well to participate. In addition, the in-
kind programs require additional administrative apparatus to dispense
benefits and verify results. Also, the Food Stamp program requires
participants to make monthly or bi-monthly visits to stamp dispensing
centers 2
Administrative Costs. The cost of administration is increased
by the administrative complexity throughout the system. For example,
the direct cost of administration consumes approximately 12 percent of
program costs in both AFDC and food stamps. Direct costs have in
creased rapidly on an absolute, per participant, and per $1,000 in
benefit bases.3 The direct administrative costs are for personnel, in
cluding the extra personnel needed for the checking and rechecking of
eligibility. For example, administrative costs in the AFDC program in
creased from $88.45 per $1,000 in benefits in 1971 to $123.90 in 1975
and to $147.93 in fiscal year 1977. Table 1 gives administrative costs
for three programs for the years 1971, 1975, 1977.
1lbid
2lbjd
Congress, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on Errors
in Welfare Programs, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1976, pp. 75-88.
TABLE 1
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS IN MAJOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,
FISCAL YEARS 1971, 1975, 1977
Total
(millions of dollars) Per Participant Per $1,030 of Benefits
Program 1971 1975 1977a 1971 1975 1977a 1971 1975 1977a
AFDC 485 1,042 1,496 52.01 94.09 130.05 88.45 123.90 147.93
Food Stamps 104 592 689 11.13 34.72 36.46 61.54 134.76 116.56
551b - 460 592 - - - - 56.17 77.53
~Proj ected.
Includes federal costs only.
Source: Congressional Research Service, “Administrative Costs of Public Assistance Programs.”
Mimeographed, 1976, p. 2.
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A major indirect cost is the cost caused by the number of errors
in the system. This indirect cost of administration have increased be
cause of the number of errors made in administering the programs. A
1973 HEW National Survey of AFDC errors, indicated that nearly 41 per
cent were in error either because of overpayment, underpayment or in
eligibility. Further, despite a quality control program that was
initiated in 1974 to correct these errors, 27 percent of the cases were
still found to be in error by the end of 1975. Many welfare experts
feel that the complexity of the welfare programs invites errors.1
The Growth in Welfare Expenditures
In fiscal year 1981, the major income tested assistance pro
grams; AFDC, SSI, Food Stamps, EITC, and General Assistance, as pro
posed by the Carter administration, would cost over $30 billion for
over 40 million recipients.2 The growth of expenditures for welfare
benefits and coverage has been the focus of some concern. One example
of this growth is that the federal income assistance expenditures grew
at a rate that was two-thirds higher than the rate of growth of the
federal budget between 1965 and l975.~ Inflation, expansion of
coverage, and policy changes all contributed to the rapid growth of
welfare costs. A significant series of eligibility extensions, the
creation of new programs or major revisions of in-kind programs
1lbid.
2U5 Congressional Office, The Budget of the United States,
Fiscal Year 1981.
3Plotnick and Skidmore, Progress Against Poverty, p. 110.
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dramatic expansions in program costs.1
The way in which costs of income assistance programs are dis
tributed has become a burden to state and local governments as total costs
have increased due to inflation and expansion of benefits and coverage.
All of the major need based assistance programs (AFDC, SSI, EITC, etc.),
with the exception of food stamps, require state/local financial par
ticipation.2 The state and local governments are required to pay up to
50 percent of the costs of some programs, and the costs of the programs
have been rapidly increasing over recent years.3
Despite a general increase in the relative size of the federal
contribution, state and local spending on needs-tested programs in
creased more than four-fold in actual dollars, and two and one-half
times in constant dollars from 1965 to l975.~ One study of state
spending determined that public welfare consumed 18.5 percent of all
state spending in 1975, up from 13.2 percent in 1965. Table 2 gives
the state spending percentages on welfare for selected states and com
pares them for years 1965 and 1975. The escalation of state and local
costs as prompted by expanded AFDC participation, increased AFDC bene
fit levels, and the Medicaid program. As a result of these factors,
welfare spending has been increasing at a rate 40 percent faster than
the rate of growth of overall state spending. Added to this burden is
the fact that thirty-three states finance general assistance programs
2U.S. Congress, Handbook of Public Income Transfer Program,
pp. 153, 221.
3lbid.
4Burke, Federal and State-Local Expenditures for Income Trans
fers to Persons with Limited Income, Fiscal Years 1975 and 1976.
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for needy persons who are ineligible for federal assistance.1
TABLE 2
STATE SPENDING FOR PUBLIC WELFARE AS A PROPORTION
OF ALL STATE SPENDING, 1965 AND 1975, SELECTED
STATES (PERCENTAGE)
All Sources State Sources Only
1965 1975 1965 1975
California 17.3 24.3 10.9 17.4
Connecticut 14.8 19.9 10.7 12.3
Georgia 13.6 18.2 5.7 8.0
Louisiana 19.4 12.4 8.0 5.6
Michigan 9.5 27.1 5.6 20.2
Mississippi 14.4 12.5 6.9 5.7
New York 14.2 23.7 7.6 10.2
Oregon 10.2 15.5 8.7 11.8
Texas 12.1 13.9 4.2 5.2
All 13.2 18.5 7.5 11.8
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances
in 1975; Governmental Finances in 1964-65 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1966, 1975).
In conclusion, the welfare system fails to achieve many desired
goals. The welfare reform goals of adequacy, equity, target efficiency,
administrative efficiency, and work incentives are being inadequately
met. Waste and error, inequities, poor coordination, inadequacies, and
complexity prevent the welfare recipients and society from obtaining max
irnum benefits from the system. The continuing search for welfare reform
strategies must center on effectively dealing with the trade-offs and
conflicting character of our welfare reform goals.
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CHAPTER III
INCREMENTAL AND COMPREHENSIVE WELFARE REFORMS
The basic controversial issue of welfare reform focuses on how
to change the welfare system to more optimally provide assistance to
the low income population given budgetary and political restraints.
The major questions are: (1) Should the present system be modified (an
incremental change approach)? (2) Should the present system be abolish
ed in lieu of an entirely new one (a comprehensive restructuring ap
proach)? The alternatives are still being debated and examined. The
alternative that is selected must deal with the trade-offs that are
involved in meeting our major welfare reform goals.
The Incremental Change Approach (Incremental
Reform Approach)
The incremental change approach entails step by step modifica
tions of the welfare system to eradicate its problems. The categori
cal system of benefits would be retained and administrative obligations
would remain divided among the federal, state, and local governments.
The incremental change approach has been used to make improvements and
address problems of the welfare system in its development. Thus, it is
in keeping with the traditional modus operandi of the welfare system
to use an incremental change approach to eliminate its problems.1
‘U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Welfare
Reform: Issues, Objectives and Approaches, p. 32.
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Proponents of the incremental change approach state that this
approach could improve the efficacy and efficiency of the welfare sys
tem in the following ways: (1) Improve program administration through
new designs and rules; (2) Standardize the benefits of existing pro
grams; and (3) Broaden and liberalize eligibility standards. litimately
these modifications would lead to a more equitable distribution of
benefits, reduced program expenditures, and better targeting of bene
1
fits on the most needy. If all necessary reforms are implemented ex
perts think that the incremental change approach can lead to a system
that is very similar to types proposed by advocates of the comprehen
sive restructuring approach without its uncertainty and greater initial
costs 2
Advantages of the Incremental Change Approach
Advocates of the incremental change approach cite economic and
political advantages of this approach over the comprehensive restruc
turing approach. First, the initial cost of an incremental change ap
proach is estimated to be low when compared with the cost of initiating
an entirely new system as sought by advocates of the comprehensive re
structuring approach. Second, experts predict that comprehensive re
form proposals will cost more than the existing system on the average
because most of the comprehensive reform proposals will considerably
expand the eligibility of the existing system and thus increase the
number of participants . In the present political climate, with its
1lbid., p. 33.
2Gordon Weil, The Welfare Debate of 1978, The Institute of
Socioeconomic Studies (New York: Pilgrim Publishers, 1978), p. 10.
3u.s. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Welfare
Reform: Issues, Objectives and Approaches, pp. 32-35.
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emphasis on fiscal restraint and budget reductions, low costs are
important.
The incremental change approach is also more acceptable than a
comprehensive restructuring approach to the welfare bureaucracy and
those with welfare interests because the effects of a wide sweeping
change have not been determined. Although there have been a number of
social experiments and a considerable research effort, not enough is
known about the effects of a totally restructured system on labor mar
kets, industry, and family and social patterns.1 Early in the Carter
administration, the then Secretary of the Department of Health, Educa
tion, and Welfare (HEW), Joseph Califano, leaned toward the incremental
approach for similar reasons. He stated that, “. . .millions of Ameri
cans have come to depend on existing programs and would face the possi
ble disruption of their lives if the benefits system was subjected to
2
extensive and untested change.” Many congressional leaders also favor
an incremental change approach in improving the welfare system.
Disadvantages of the Incremental Change Approach
Many critics of the incremental change approach point out that
this approach does not correct the defects of the welfare system’s
structure. The welfare system’s complexity, overlapping programs, and
ill-coordination will remain. Thus, all of the defects of piecemeal
d~.cign will remain. Without integration and coordination of the pro
grains and functions, the effectiveness of this approach would be
i d.
2Weil, The Welfare Debate of 1978, p. 11.
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questioned.
Finally, advocates of the incremental change approach assert
that this approach is a more viable means of reform. Many economists
and social theorists feel that after reviewing the current difficulties
associated with welfare reform policy, the incremental approach is the
only realistic approach. These experts assert that not only is compre
hensive restructuring politically impossible, but it is unnecessary
and undesirable.2
The Comprehensive Restructuring Approach
(Comprehensive Reform Approach)
The comprehensive restructuring approach offers a number of
proposals to improve the efficacy and efficiency of the welfare system.
Proposals fall in two basic categories: (1) A work-welfare approach or
multi-track system for the needy who are able to work and those who are
not able to work, and (2) A comprehensive cash assistance approach or
negative income tax that would provide a single program of cash bene
fits and eliminate the present system of cash and in-kind benefits.
These proposals would implement new strategies and phase out all or
most of the present systems’ structures.3
The Work-Welfare Approach - The Demand Side
of the Labor Market
The most unique feature of recent and pending work-welfare re
form approaches is their explicit focus on the demand side of the labor
1U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Welfare
Reform: Issues, Objectives and Approaches, pp. 32-35.
2Doolittle, Levy, Wiseman, “The Mirage of Welfare Reform,”
pp. 62-87.
3U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Welfare
Reform: Issues, Objectives, and Approaches, pp. 37-45.
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market. The immediate objective of these reforms is to create jobs
that welfare recipients can fill immediately. Thus, work habits and
skills acquired can lead to financial independence. This approach
offers hope of increasing the employment of the poor and reducing wel
fare caseloads.1
Many previous reforms such as the 1967 Work Incentive Program
(WIN) emphasized investments in human capital that focused on the sup
ply side of the labor market. The goal of these reforms was to alter
the characteristics of welfare recipients by making them more attrac
tive to employers on the theory that a skilled worker creates his own
demand. Thus, the demand side of the labor market was not focused on.
It was implicitly assumed that jobs for welfare recipients were already
there in the form of standing vacancies or would soon be created when
employers saw the transformed labor supply entering the market. The
importance of these recent reforms is not the availability of job
opportunity (WIN and WIN II were job oriented programs), but the focus
on these types of opportunities and the level of funding for these pro
grams. Ultimately, these reforms and some recent experiments seek to
expose more welfare recipients to these opportunities while reducing
or eliminating supply side services.2
The work-welfare approach makes working or a willingness to
work a condition for program participation. This approach separates
the low-income population into two groups: those who are employable
and those who are not employable (includes the aged, the disabled, and
‘Bradley Schiller, “Welfare: Reforming Our Expectations,” The
Public Interest, Vol. 2, Winter 1981, pp. 55-64.
2lbid
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those who care for small children). Those who are not employable would
receive benefits through categorical programs (AFDC, SSI, etc.) or a
comprehensive cash assistance plan. Those who are employable would re
ceive assistance in one of three forms: work conditioned benefits which
are connected to earned income, a guaranteed job program providing pub
lic or private sector employment, and benefits that would be tied to
training, educational, and employment programs. The work-welfare ap
proach also has a major goal of providing training and placement ser
vices for those who are employable to better enable them to be absorbed
into the private sector and thus reduce long-run costs for the total
1program.
The Guaranteed Jobs Approach
An important alternative within the work-welfare approach is
the guaranteed jobs program. The objective of the guaranteed job pro
gram is to provide either public or private sector jobs to low-income
families with an employable member. Government extension of tax cre
dits and wage subsidies is designed to encourage employers to create
private sector jobs. The guaranteed jobs programs would offer job
opportunities to welfare recipients, who may not ordinarily get this
opportunity.2
The Work Equity Project. One recent demonstration program
testing the guaranteed lobs approach that has received much attention
is The Work Equity Project (WEP). WEP is a guaranteed, mandatory jobs
program that has been underway since mid-1978 in Minnesota. This
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Welfare
Reform: Issues, Objectives and Approaches, pp. 37-45.
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program requires that all employable AFDC, General Assistance, and Food
Stamp recipients in participating counties accept jobs in community
work projects, if other suitable employment cannot be secured. WEP is
funded and designed to supply jobs for all employable welfare recipi
ents. A distinguishing feature of this program is that unlike WIN,
CETA, Supported Work, Mr. Reagan’s welfare reform in California, and
other similar programs, it is in a position to serve all eligible re
cipients. WEP therefore is testing a program’s ability to create jobs.1
Though preliminary assessment of the work-welfare demonstration
projects indicate that participants did go on to find more and better
employment, the overall net results have been only modest. One pre
dominant problem in the several work-welfare demonstration projects
examined was that there was a high early drop-out rate of participants.
Administrators found that providing jobs in the public sector was not
difficult but providing welfare recipients with skills, services, and
confidence was a formidable task.
Trade-Offs of the Guaranteed Job Approach. Advocates of the
guaranteed job approach cite two major advantages over the other alter
natives: (1) Taxpayers are more willing to reward work than to provide
welfare, and (2) A government guarantee of the right to work. Critics
of this approach cite many perceived drawbacks. Mandatory work-welfare
reforms have the drawback of not offering any provisions for child care
or transportation costs. In addition, participants are not allowed to
choose their employer which can be an important decision. Other major
1Schiller, “Welfare: Reforming Our Expectations,” p. 59.
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problems are:
1. Whether it will be possible to create the necessary
number of jobs (one to two million)? The question
becomes more difficult in times of sluggish economic
growth.
2. How could it be ensured that jobs are distributed in
the areas of the eligible population and that these
jobs would match the skills of the recipients?
3. Would mass public service employment provide meaning
ful work experience that would lead to private
sector employment?
4. Will guaranteed public jobs undermine the low wage
private sector of the economy by being more attrac
tive than low wage private sector jobs?
5. Will guaranteed public sector jobs displace state and
local employees?
6. Will the cost of a guaranteed jobs program be exorbi
tant (one million jobs could cost as much as $8.3
billion) ?1
Work-Conditioned Benefits Programs
Work conditioned benefits programs reward work by providing a
wage subsidy to overall earnings that is tied to the number of hours
worked or by an earned income tax credit. Work conditioned programs
seek to direct benefits to the working poor. These programs focus on
assisting the employable population. For example, in one work condi
tioned program proposal the participants would lose only a fraction of
their AFDC benefits with an increase in earnings, leading to an in
crease in total income, but one LhaL was less Lhan Lhe addicional earii
ings. In other words, if earnings were increased by $1,000, income
would increase by less than $750 because of a partial but not equiva
lent reduction in welfare payments. With the exception of the EITC,
1U.S. Department of HEW, Welfare Reform: Issues, Objectives
and Approaches, pp. 37-45.
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most current programs do not focus on the working poor and work con
1
ditioned programs could increase their coverage and benefits.
Trade Offs of Work Conditioned Programs. Advocates of this
approach cite these advantages: (1) Those working full-time but earn—
ing an inadequate income would have their earnings supplemented;
(2) this approach strengthens the attachment of the low income popula
tion to the labor market because participants are rewarded for having
job and benefits rise with additional work effort; (3) these financial
incentives encourage job searching and independence.2
Critics of work conditioned benefits cite these problems:
(1) This type of reform could further complicate administrative pro
cedures instead of simplifying them; (2) this approach could ineffi
ciently target benefits on the poor because wage subsidies and tax
credits are difficult to relate directly to need as determined by
family characteristics; and (3) there is no provision in this approach
to aid those who are employable but are not fortunate enough to obtain
3jobs.
A Multi-Track Approach
A multi-track approach entails the utilization of different
types of separate programs to meet the various needs of the low income
population. Each track is a different program to meet different needs.
One track that would aid workers with low paying jobs is a work-condi





program for those who are not employable and an unemployment insurance
program for the unemployed not eligible for the regular insurance bene
1fits.
Trade-Offs. Advocates of the multi-track approach cite these
advantages over the other work-welfare approaches: (1) The multi-track
approach acknowledges that potential recipients may not have enough
training for needed public or private sector jobs; and (2) This ap
proach also allows for the possibility that a guaranteed jobs program
may be difficult to set up on a large enough scale. Critics of the
multi-track approach cite two basic problems: (1) The complexities of
administering a multi-track program, and (2) potential problems that




The comprehensive cash assistance approach would provide a
single cash system that would replace many of the current programs of
the welfare system. This approach would be universal in nature as op
posed to the categorical format for current programs. Other charac
teristics of this approach are: (1) benefits would be available to
those who met simplified criteria; (2) criteria would stress the in
comes and assets of applicants rather than their family situations or
potential for employment; and (3) work Incentives would slem from
benefits and would phase out gradually so that those who worked would





approaches include the Negative Income Tax programs (NIT) and the
guaranteed income proposals.
Trade-Offs. Advocates of the comprehensive cash assistance
approach cite several advantages this approach has over the others:
1. This approach would be more equitable because it would
provide a more uniform treatment of low-income persons.
2. The recipients could decide how to best meet their
particular needs because all of the assistance would
be provided in cash as opposed to in-kind benefits.
3. This approach could simplify the administration of the
welfare system and reduce administrative costs by
eliminating duplication.
4. Recipients would not be induced to alter their family
situations or labor market behavior because of cate
gorization or work requirements.i
Critics, however, cite shortcomings of this approach:
1. Providing universal treatment for all could be unfair
and excessively costly because different solutions
may be needed for different causes of poverty.
2. The administrative simplicity and cost savings anti
cipated for the comprehensive cash assistance approach
may be mitigated because of the dynamic nature of the
welfare population.2 The normal flow of families off
and onto welfare is continuous due to changing personal,
family, and economic circumstances. As people move on
to and off of welfare their eligibility status must be
determined repeatedly. Many administrative dollars are
spent in this process. In addition, savings thought to
come from utilizing the income tax system to determine
need is questionable because circumstances of recipi
ents can change from month to month. Thus~a compre
hensive cash assistance plan cannot be grafted onto the
income tax system.
The Guaranteed Income Approach
Another of the comprehensive restructuring approaches that has
been seriously considered and supported is the guaranteed income
1lbid.
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approach. The guaranteed income approach advocates the government pro
viding a minimum level of income for those who are unable to work and for
those who are unable to earn enough by working. This approach has three
basic tenets: (1) that everyone has a right to a basic level of in
come, (2) that the government should guarantee to every citizen a level
of cash income that is high enough for an individual or family to live
in moderate comfort, and (3) that there should be no restrictions on
the use of the money. This approach would automatically provide bene
fits for every needy person and in some special cases of dire need,
this basic income guarantee could be supplemented.1
Presidential advisors, economists, and social~~ theorists have
proposed various guaranteed income plans. These have included Milton
Friedman’s Negative Income Tax (1962), Robert Theobald’s guaranteed
income (1965), James Tobin’s guaranteed income plan (1965), R. J.
Lampman’s subsidy plan (1967), Edward Schwartz’ guaranteed income
(1967), President Johnson’s Income Maintenance Commission Proposals
(1969), President Nixon’s Family Assistance Plans (1969), George
McGovern’s $1,000 a year Demogrant plan (1972), The Great Britain
credit income tax (1972), and HEW’s Income Supplementation plan (1974) 2
Each of the plans would require the government to provide minimum in
come guarantees that ranged from $1,500 to $6,000 for the average
family of four. The marginal tax rates of these plans have ranged
from 50 percent to over 100 percent. The costs of the plans ranged
from a low of several billion to a high of over $50 billion. These
1Tobin, “The Case for an Income Guarantee,” p. 34.
2flerman Berliner (ed.), Programs to Prevent Poverty, Series
12, Vol. 2 (New York: Hofstra University Press, 1978), p. 465.
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proposals would add millions of participants to the welfare structure.’
Benefit Levels (Adequacy), Marginal Tax
Rates and Cost
A major goal of the guaranteed income plans is to provide a
package of adequate support levels, effective work incentives, and
a program cost that is reasonable. A major problem in reaching this
goal is that it is difficult to reach the objectives of adequate
levels of support, effective work incentives, and a program cost that
is reasonable simultaneously.2 Benefit levels, marginal rate of
taxation, and overall program cost are tightly interwoven factors.
For instance, if the level of benefits is increased and the tax rate
is held constant, the overall program cost must increase or if the
overall cost is held constant, the tax rate must increase and so on.
For every guaranteed income plan the mathematical relationship be
tween the benefit levels, marginal tax rates, and costs are fixed.3
Additional problems in initiating a guaranteed income plan revolve
around determining an adequate level of support, determining effec
tive work incentives via marginal tax rates and financing the costs
of the plan.4
llbid
2Tobin, “The Case for an Income Guarantee,” pp. 37 and 39.
3Hausman, “Cumulative Tax Rates in Alternative Income
Maintenance Systems,” p. 77.
4lbid., p. 80.
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An Assessment of Some Selected
Guaranteed Income Plans
The guaranteed income proposals discussed here were proposed in
the decade of the sixties. These proposals or plans are models and
standard bearers of the more recent guaranteed income plans and illus
trate some of the best ideas to be developed in this area. An assess
ment of these five plans will be given in terms of the conceptual
issues to offer insight into the potential effectiveness of the guaran
teed income approach. In addition, this assessment will give some
indication as to the effects of a hybrid plan.
The five plans reviewed in Table 3 show the basic features of:
(1) eliminating all or most of the present welfare programs, (2) the
use of federal income tax reporting to determine the amount of bene
fits to be received, and (3) varying benefit levels, marginal tax rates,
and annual cost.
These plans also included such features as adjustable income
guarantees, a subsidy to help those in the middle income groups with
the problem of job displacement and universal medical coverage.
When these plans are reviewed in terms of adequacy we find that
the Friedman and Lampman plans provide very low benefit levels of sup
port. The Friedman plan would provide only $2,000 for a family of
four. The Lampman plan reduces its subsidy as income rises to $3,000.
Also, the Tobin plan provides a low level of support at the bottom of
the earnings scale. However, the Theobald and Schwartz plans provide
the best income levels of this group $3,200 and $3,000 respectively,
making these plans the most expensive in terms of cost.1
1Berliner, Programs to Prevent Poverty, pp. 468-470.
TABLE 3
MAJOR PROVISIONS OF SELECTED GUARANTEED INCOME PROPOSALS*
R.J. Lampman’a Subsidy Plan Schwartz’ Guaranteed Income Friedman’s Negative Income
Theobsld’s P1st (1965) (1967) Tobin Proposal (1965) (1967) Tax (1962)
Eliminates SS, lines- Eliminates some existing Old age, survivors and Phase out welfare programa This plan would substitute
ployment compensation welfare programs but re- disability insurance file statement of income for Medicare, old-age
subsidies and ether tains old-age, aurvivora would be continued for and dependents. survivors and disability
COVERAGE assistance. Requires and disability insursnce. those not eligible for insurance, old-age assist-
universal medirsl Federal income tax report- the income allowances. snce and other measures of
coverage. ing will indicate the Nould gradually phase assistance. A tax should
amount of subsidy payment. out medical care and be paid only when family
housing subsidies. All income is greater than total
adjustments would be exemptions and deductions.
msde at income tax
filing time.
Basic economic secur- A family of 4 would re- Every taxpayer would This plan ham 3 different A family of 4 has a total
ity: $1,090 for each ceive $1,500 if they receive $400 payment yearly income levels, of $4,009 in deductions 6
adult, $609 for each earned zero income (the for each family member, $3,000,$4,000, 6 $5,000. exemptions. If the family
child. Thus, a breakeven level is A family of 4 would re- For the minimum level, for has no income the family
BFNEFITS family of four re- $3,000). If this family ceive $1,600. Each faa- example, a family of 4 would receive $2,000 orceives $3,200. If a earned $500 they would ily is allowed to keep thst earned zero income 50% of $4,000-O. A family
family of 4 earns receive $1,625; if they two-thirds of its would receive $3,000. As with income of $3,000
$2,000, they wauld earned $1,000 they would income, earnings rose the percent would receive $500 or 50%
receive $1,200. receive $1,750. of earnings retained of ($4,000-$3,000).
would decrease.
$25 to $30 billion Depends on level of income $12 6 $15 billion $11 to $38 billion depend- About $10 billion annually.
COSTS per year funded by guarantee 6 number of annually. ing on expenditure level.
general revenuas. recipients. Income guaran
tees are adjustable.




The Friedman, Lampman, and Tobin plans have the best work in
centives in terms of their marginal tax rates. The Friedman plan
allows recipients to retain 50 percent of their earnings. The Lampman
plan allows recipients to retain 25 to co percent of their earnings.
For example, if earned income is $2,000 which is $1,000 below the break-
even point of $3,000, then the rate of subsidy would be 25 percent of
$1,000 or $250 for a total income of $2,250; if earned income decreased
to zero, with the same breakeven point of $3,000 then the rate of sub
sidy would be 50 percent of $3,000 or $1,500, a total income of $1,500.
Thus, the marginal tax rate varies inversely with income levels. The
Tobin plan allows recipients to retain two-thirds of their earnings.1
The Theobald and Schwartz plans have higher marginal tax rates
though they provide the best level of support. The Theobald plan al
lows a family of four to retain only 10 percent of their income above
$3,200 level. In the Schwartz plan, income above $3,000 is taxed at a
rate of 60 percent on $1,000 of earnings and it increases as earnings
increase. Thus, these two plans cause concern about a possible work
disincentive effect 2
The federal tax laws pose problems for both the Friedman and
Laiupman plans because of a double exemption. For instance, in the
Friedman plan, a family that earns less than the sum of its exemptions,
deductions would be taxed at a rate of 50 percent. However, when earn
ings exceed this sum, the tax would apply at 14 percent of the lowest
1lbid
2 i d.
bracket. The resultant effect is that of a regressive tax. Also, in





THE EFFECT OF INCOME GUARANTEES ON WORK
Some Potential Economic Consequences of a
Guaranteed Income
A great deal of concern has been voiced about the effect of an
income guarantee on an individual’s incentive to work. Economists have
written extensively on the effect of increased income on work effort.
The theory of consumer behavior of the choice between leisure and in
come points out that each consumer is confronted with a fundamental
trade off between the consumption of goods and services (income) and
the consumption of leisure. The amount of income received by a con
sumer depends upon the amount of time allocated to work. The more one
works, the greater is his or her income. However, the more one works
the less time one has for leisure which has utility for most people.1
This trade off between work and leisure is the focal point of
the concern surrounding the economic consequences of a guaranteed income
(See Figure 1). “Suppose the wage rate is represented by the slope of
ZA. In absence of a guaranteed minimum income, an individual whose in
difference map is given by I, II would attain equilibrium at B, working
CZ hours and receiving income OYo. If a minimum income of OY mm is
guaranteed by the government this individual might still work CZ hours,
earn income OYo, and receive supplementary payment from the government
E. Ferguson and J. P. Gould, Microeconomic Theory, 4th edi
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1Ferguson and Gould, Microeconomic Theory, p. 74.
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of BDY0-Ymjn. In this case, however, the individual can attain a
greater level of satisfaction by doing no work at all - by moving to
point E on indifference curve II and receiving the minimum guaranteed
income from the government. From point B the individual can be induced
to work. In terms of Figure 1, if the wage rate should rise to ZF (or
higher), he or she would forego his government payment, work GZ hours,
and receive income of OY. The exact result, however, depends upon
the leisure-income preference of individuals, the level of the mini
mum income, and the wage rate available to each individual in ques
t ion • ,,l
Reduced work effort can afford advantages in the long run, if
this time is used for gaining skills via education and training. “A
predominant theory has been that ‘a national increase in education
reduces the dispersion of labor income.” Jan Tinbergen, in the
study, Income Distribution: Analysis and Policies, presents an impres
sive body of evidence on the responsiveness of differentials between
the wages of the skilled and unskilled to increases in the supply of
educated workers. Tinbergen asserts,
a policy of saturation of human capital-investment in human
capital that is over-investment relative to any efficiency
criterion may be an important option for reducing the in
equality of labor income.2
2Jan Tinbergen, “Income Distribution: Analysis and Policies”
in Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade Off. The
Brookings Institution, 1975, p. 156.
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Marginal Tax Rates
A major component that guaranteed income plans use as a work
incentive is the marginal tax rates of the plans. Every guaranteed in
come plan has a schedule of benefit reductions as the recipients’ earned
income increases. This tax has the same effect as normal taxes on the
incentive to work, the higher the tax the less the motivation to work.
The marginal tax rates of the existing welfare programs are in the
range of 70 percent and greater, a rate that would cause reductions in
work effort. However, many who propose welfare reform plans with mar
ginal tax rates of 50 to 60 percent consider their rates to be relative
ly low. Some welfare experts estimate that the marginal tax rates of
welfare reform plans should be 30 percent or lower to have only a mini
mal effect on work effort of recipients.1
Psychological Aspects
Advocates of a guaranteed income such as psychologist Eric
Fromm, suggest that people may initially prefer not to work for a short
period of time, but that the vast majority would have a great desire
for work. Fromm feels that exploitation of the guaranteed income would
stop after a short period of time, just as people would not overeat
sweets after a short period of time. His premise is based on the fact
that Americans are preoccupied with the work ethic. He feels that this
preoccupation is not likely to disappear.2 However, Fromm does not
~U.s. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fis
cal Policy, How Income Supplements Can Effect Work Behavior
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 59-60.
2Erich Fronim, “The Psychological Aspects of the Guaranteed
Income,” in Robert Theobald (editor), The Guaranteed Income: Next Step
in Economic Evolution? (New York: Doubleday Press, 1968), pp. 177-179.
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determine how long it would take for people to increase their work
effort.
Research on the Effects of a Guaranteed Income
Over the last decade, a great amount of research and data have
been accumulated by scholars and government analysts on the effects of
a guaranteed income. These studies have mostly focused on the behavior
of welfare recipients and low income workers under conditions that ap
proximate conditions which would exist under a guaranteed income.
While the results of these studies are inconclusive, they merit close
consideration.
Three major types of research studies have been used in an at
tempt to estimate the effect of welfare reform plans on the work effort
of the poor and near poor. The first type is based on an analysis of
existing welfare programs and examines if welfare recipients have
changed their attitudes toward work. The second type, called the cross-
section approach involves a statistical and economic analysis of large
quantities of survey data, illustrating the behavior of recipients who
cope with increasingly high marginal tax rates and cash transfer pay
ments. The third type consists of a series of direct experiments in
which selected families were given a form of guaranteed income and
their behavior was closely studied. The objective of these studies
was to ascertain the effect of guaranteed income payments on work
effort.
First Type: An Analysis of Existing Welfare
Programs and Recipients’ Work Effort
An example of the first type of study is one by Larry Orr and
Irwin Garfinkel on the work effort of AFDC mothers receiving an annual
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guaranteed income. The Orr and Garfinkel research indicated that on
the average the employment rates of AFDC mothers decreased by 4.5 per
cent as the annual guarantee increased by $1,000. In addition, their
research indicated that a $1,000 increase in the guarantee had a larger
effect, the smaller the initial guarantee. For example, an increase
from $500 to $1,500 led to a decrease in employment rates of about 14
percent 1
An earlier study by Leonard Hausman analyzed a survey of 50,000
AFDC families in 1967 who lived in the states of Alabama, Kentucky, and
Mississippi, each of which guaranteed different levels of income in the
absence of non-welfare income. Hausman’s findings indicated that an in
crease in monthly AFDC payments from $82 to $162 caused a decline of 36
percent in the market work effort of these female headed famlies. Haus
man concluded that if AFDC mothers can reach income targets with less
effort they will reduce that effort. Both studies indicate that female
heads of households would reduce their work effort with guaranteed in
come plans and that the work reduction effect is greater the higher the
marginal tax rate.2
Second Type: The Cross Section Approach
The cross section studies were based on aggregate sta
tistical data that were used to predict the economic behavior of the low
income worker. These studies focused on possible changes in the work
effort of low income male workers. Research institutions, distinguished
1Garfinkel, “Income Transfer Programs and Work Effort: A
Review,” p. 25.
2Leonard J. Hausman, “The Impact of Welfare on the Work Effort
of AFDC Mothers,” in The President’s Commission on Income Maintenance
Programs, (Washington, D.C.: Technical Studies, 1970), p. 97.
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economists, and the federal government have conducted many studies in
this area. Most of these studies used aggregate statistical data which
can increase the opportunity for inaccuracy in the results. However,
these studies are valuable for estimating the direction and order of
magnitude of changes in the work effort of low-income male workers.1
A cross section approach study by Greenburg and Kosters attempt
ed to simulate the effects of a welfare reform similar to President
Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan. This study used an income guarantee of
$3,500 for a family of four and a marginal tax rate of 75 percent.
They estimated that working men with family responsibilities would re
duce the number of hours they worked by 29 percent. Thus, they con
cluded that married male heads of participating families (in an income
guarantee program) would substantially reduce their work effort.
Another cross section approach study ~by Kalanchek and Kaines called
“Labor Supply and the Negative Income Tax” developed an economic model
that would simulate the effects of a guaranteed income of $2,400 (for
a family of four) and a marginal tax rate of 50 percent. They esti
mated in this study that male family members would reduce their labor
supply by 37 percent. Also, they estimated that such a plan would pro
duce a 46 percent reduction in the labor supply of the eligible popula
tion. They note that the income guarantee and the marginal tax rate of
1liavid Greenburg and Marvin Kosters, “Income Guarantees and the
Working Poor,” in Income Maintenance and The Labor Supply: Econometric
Studies (Chicago: Rand McNally Publishers, 1973), p. 74.
2
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this plan were relatively low.1
The findings of these studies are that a guaranteed income would
reduce the work effort of male low-income workers. The economic simula
tions suggest that reductions in work effort would accompany even low
level guarantees. Some welfare experts think that the opportunity costs
associated with low paying jobs are greater than those associated with
welfare. One such expert, Nathan Glazer, points out that the welfare
system offers advantages far in excess of those available from low pay
ing jobs open to the inner city poor. Welfare offers medical coverage,
security, stability, and other benefits that are lacking or inadequate
in many low paying jobs. Glazer proposed a solution to this problem-
offer sufficient benefits to those in low-wage and seasonal labor mar
kets. This would make traditionally low paying jobs more attractive by
2offering the needed benefits to these workers.
Third Type: Experimental Demonstration
Programs
The third group of studies consisted of experimental programs.
First, a relatively large group of people with similar backgrounds (in
cluding age, income, education, family size, economic, and social char
acteristics) was selected. Then the selected group was divided into a
control group and an experimental group. The control group continued
their usual life cycle while the experimental group embarked on a life
style of new and varied conditions. The new and varied conditions were
‘Glen G. Cain and Harold W. Watts, “An Examination of Recent
Cross-Sectional Evidence on Labor Force Response to Income Maintenance
Legislation in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic, Subcommittee on Fiscal
Policy, How Income Supplements Can Effect Work Behavior, 1974, p. 70.
2Nathan Glazer, “Reform Work, Not Welfare,” The Public Interest,
Vol. 40, Summer 1975.
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as follows: the experimental groups were guaranteed a certain amount of
income for a certain period, whether they worked or not; the amount of
this income guarantee and the marginal tax rate applied to the experi
mental groups’ earnings varied.
The most well known study, the New Jersey Income Maintenance
Experiment, began in August 1969 and ended in 1972. The total cost was
$7.8 million, and it was the first large scale social experiment in the
United States. Some 1,357 households participated, 725 in the experi
mental group and 632 in the control group. The participants were from
five cities, four in New Jersey and one in Pennsylvania. Each partici
pating family had to have one male (age 18-58) who was able to work and
the family’s income had to be less than 150 percent of the poverty level.
The income guarantee varied from 50 to 125 percent of the poverty level
and the marginal tax rate varied from 30 to 70 percent. There was no
work requirement for the participants.1
Preliminary data from the New Jersey experiment indicated that
there was no evidence that work effort declined among those receiving
income support payments. However, the final results indicated that the
number of employed family members decreased 9.5 percent, but not for the
control group.2 The experimental and political credibility of this ex
periment were challenged by those who thought the experiment was being
used to promote the political feasibility of a negative income tax.
Also, some doubted the experiment’s objectivity as it was discovered
that its administrators, designers, and sponsors were for income
1David Kershaw and Jerilyn Fair, The New Jersey Income Mainte
nance Experiment, Vol. I, Operations, Surveys and Administration (New
Yrok: Academic Press, 1976), p. 13.
2lbid., p. 4.
62
guarantees.1 Charges by the press that the experiment was rigged were
denied. In Daniel Moynihan’s book, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income,
Moynihan relates that, “the charge was a lie but was probably believed!”
It did not help the experiment when the General Accounting Office audit
ed the initial findings and declared them “premature.”2
The New Jersey Experiment examined the work effort of various
members of the experimental families. The most important group or
key group of the experiment was non—aged, able-bodied males with
family responsibilities because it was feared “that given an income
alternative, they would decide not to work.”3 “Over the central
two years of the experiment,.. .the employment rate for male fan~ily heads
in the experimental group was only 1.5 percent less than for the con
trols.”4 The next most important group as determined by policy inter
ests were wives. The wives on the average were mothers of four children
(the average family size was six). For wives, the difference between
the experimentals and the controls was significant. The experimental
wives worked, “23 percent fewer hours per week and their employment rate
was 24 percent less than the control group of wives.”5 In that wives in
six-person families work hard inside the home, this can be a desirable
outcome. Thus, “this work could be more beneficial or cost effective
1.Ibid., p. xix.
2Daniel Moynihan, I’he Politics of a (~uaranteed Income. In Martin
Anderson, Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United
States (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 104.





from a national viewpoint than the low-wage market labor.” Finally,
when the total family labor supply (a composite of market work by the
husband, the wife, and other adult family members) was examined over
the central two years, the number employed per family was 9.5 percent
less for experimental families than for controls. The disincentive
effect can be considered socially useful in that the secondary earners
could benefit. Wives could decide to work more in the home, teenagers
could stay in school longer because of the payments (guaranteed in
come), and older workers could take it a bit easier. “These benefits
represented a net increase in family income,.. .a greater command over
material goods and services and enhancing their economic well-being.”1
At the same time, six other major guaranteed iiicome experiments
were initiated. The New Jersey experiment analyzed the work effort of
husbands and wives of various ethnic groups living in an eastern urban
environment. Two other guaranteed income experiments were set up ex
pressly to analyze the work behavior of poor families living in rural
areas. These “Rural Income Maintenance Experiments” were carried out
in Iowa and North Carolina.2 Another experiment was the “Gary Income
Maintenance Experiment,” which focused on black families and included
1lbid.
2 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Summary
Report: Rural Income Maintenance Experiment (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1976).
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female-headed families previously on welfare in urban, Gary, Indiana.1
The Seattle and Denver Maintenance Experiments analyzed the work effort
of husbands, wives, and female headed families in Seattle, Washington
and Denver, Colorado.2
Many feel that the three most significant guaranteed income ex
periments in terms of measuring the national impact of a guaranteed in
come were the New Jersey, the Seattle, and the Denver experiments. The re
sults of the New Jersey, Seattle, and Denver experiments were similar
for husbands. The measured reduction in hours of work by white husbands
in New Jersey was 6 percent and for black and white husbands in the
Seattle and Denver experiments, it was 6 percent also.
Critics of the guaranteed income experiments and others cite a
number of methodological biases that could have underestimated the reduc
tion in work effort as measured by the guaranteed income experiments.
Three examples of the cited biases are the Hawthorne effect, the wind
fall effect, and the small size effect. The Hawthorne effect is charac
teristic of socio-economic experiments. “Merely by asking participants
for their cooperation in the guaranteed income experiments, the investi
gators had stimulated a new attitude among the participants who now felt
themselves part of an important group.”3 Martin Anderson, economist and
presidential advisor, notes that participants were subjected to an
1Kenneth C. Kherr, The Gary Income Maintenance Experiment,
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Washington, D.C.: Govern
ment Printing Office, 1977).
2Mordecai Kurz and Robert Spiegalman, The Design of the Seattle
and Denver Income Maintenance Experiment (Menlo Park: Stanford Research
Institute, 1972).
3Anderson, Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in
in the United States, p. 104.
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unusual and extensive amount of personal attention. Thus, participants
were made to feel important which ultimately influenced their behavior.
Participants quickly learned what the investigators liked and would then
try to please them by acting accordingly. Mordecai Kurz, professor of
economics at Stanford University and Robert Spiegelman of Stanford Re
search Institute poin.ted out that Hawthorne effects have become well
known. “If for example families on the income maintenance experiment
develop a sense of ‘experimental responsibility,’ they may behave quite
differently than a control group without such a sense of responsibility.”1
The windfall effect is the effect caused by participants viewing
income guarantees as windfalls, a small fortune that would not last long.
Economist Jacob Mincer characterized it, “the short run response of a par
ticular part of the population to a temporary flow of cash grants.”2
Henry Aaron observed, “...the brief duration of the experiment is likely
to lead to estimates of the sensitivity of labor supply to guarantee
levels that are too low.”3 In addition, experts point out that it is
difficult to estimate the size of the windfall bias.
The small size effect is an effect that makes it difficult to
project what might happen if a guaranteed income were instituted on a
nation wide basis. Aaron states, “the thinness of the sample and the
brevity of the experiments make it impossible to observe the impact of
a negative impact on the mores of the entire group.”4 The results of
1 . ,,Kurz and Spiegelman, The Seattle Experiment: The Combined Effect
of Income Maintenance and Manpower Investments.” This paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of American Economic Association of American Economic
Review, Vol. LXI, May 1971, p. 27.
2Anderson, Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in




such small scale experiments make it difficult to anticipate the be
havior of all the low-income population. It must be noted that an
effort was made to correct for this bias in the Seattle-Denver experi
ments .
The Seattle and Denver experiments were larger and more compre
hensive than the New Jersey experiment. According to Michael Keeley of
the Stanford Research Institute, the most important advantages of the
Seattle and Denver experiments were the larger sample size (5,000 fami
lies) and the more generous negative income tax plans which were de
signed to dominate welfare programs such as AFDC and Food Stamps. Fur
ther, the Seattle and Denver experiments’ results were adjusted to
expand the information gained into a national focus. The analysts of
the Seattle and Denver experiments constructed an economic model that
allowed them to infer from their small sample what would happen if the
experiment was conducted on a national scale. The report of the ana
lysts states that “to provide meaningful predictions of the effects of
a particular national program, a labor supply response model.. .must be
used.” Subsequently, their economic model predicted when using an in
come guarantee of $3,750 in 1974 and a marginal tax rate of 70 percent
that the national effect of a guaranteed income program would be to cause
husbands to reduce their work effort by 11.2 percent, wives by 32.2 per
cent, and females who head families by 9.4 percent.2
‘M. Keeley, P. Robbins, R. Spiegelman, and R. West, Labor
Supply Effects and Costs of Alternative Negative Income Tax Programs:
Evidence from the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments,
Part II: National Predictions Using the Labor Suvnly Response Function
(Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, Memo 39, 1977), p. 14,
Table 4.
2lbid., p. 21, Table 6, p. 23, Table 8.
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These studies were not considered definitive and there is every
possibility that a host of biases could have understated the results.
The results of the studies of existing welfare programs, economic simu
lations, and six major guaranteed income experiments indicate that there
will be a reduction in the work effort as a result of income guarantees.
How much of a reduction depends upon the leisure-income preferences of
individuals, the level of minimum income, and the wage rate available
to each individual or group in question. However, this reduction in
work effort can be used to benefit society via greater opportunities
for education, training, and improved life styles.
CHAPTER V
AN ASSESSMT3NT OF THE 1977 CARTER ADMINISTRATION
PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR BETTER JOBS
AND INCOME (PBJI)
An Assessment of the Program for Better Jobs
and Income
The Carter administration proposal, Program for Better Jobs and
Income (PBJI) of 1977, illustrates a comprehensive reform approach that
utilizes both a comprehensive cash assistance program and a guaranteed
jobs program. The focus of this proposal was both on the demand side of
the labor market(for those who are employable) with the guaranteed jobs
program and expanded benefits and coverage for those who are unable to
work. This proposal was unable to attract the broad coalition of sup
port needed to pass the legislation. There were doubts about the
adequacy, equity, level of work incentives, administrative efficiency,
the ability to create jobs, and the proposal’s cost. Though this pro
posal received praise for important reforms such as a national minimum
benefit level and expanded coverage for many groups, this proposal also
demonstrated how many welfare reforms fail to deal effectively with the
trade-offs inherent in the welfare reform goals.
An Overview of the Carter Administration Proposals
Carter’s PBJI was offered as a comprehensive reform proposal
that would increase job opportunities for the low-income population
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and consolidate our major income programs into one simple and efficient
system. The PBJI had six basic objectives:
1. To divide the poor into two groups, those who can work and
those who cannot because of child care responsibilities,
age, and disabilities.
2. To create up to 1.4 million minimum wage jobs for those
who can work and who are unemployed.
3. To consolidate AFDC, SSI, and Food Stamp benefits into a
single income maintenance program open to all who are
needy including childless couples, low wage workers, and
single first time applicants.
4. To aid the working poor by expanding EITC as well as pay
ing cash benefits to those who are eligible.
5. To increase the federal share of welfare costs and pro
vide state and localities with $2.1 billion (1978
dollars) in fiscal relief in the program’s first year with
the promise of more relief in years to come.
6. To potentially reduce the number of people eligible for
welfare benefits from 40 million to 36 million; while
increasing those receiving benefits from 30 to 32 million
by reforms such as expanding the EITC and the guaranteed
jobs program.
The Carter administration calculated that their proposal would require
an outlay of $2.8 billion over and above the costs of the continuing
and existing programs for a projected cost of $31.1 billion in fiscal
1981 1
Points of Controversy
The basic points of controversy surrounding Carter’s PBJI were
the cost of the proposal, its complexity, the equity and benefit levels
of the cash program; the feasiblity and the effects of the jobs pro
gram; and the scope of the program.
1”President Carter’s Welfare Message to Congress,” The New
York Times, August 7, 1977, p. 40.
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Cost
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cast some doubt on the
actual cost of the Carter administration’s proposal. The CBO projected
that the Carter proposal would cost the government about $10 billion
more a year than the Administration estimated or $13.9 billion more in
fiscal 1982. When the CBO translated their estimate for fiscal 1982
($13.9 billion) into 1978 dollars (thats what HEW and the Carter admin
istration used for their estimates) they arrived at a net additional
cost of $12.4 billion for the Carter proposal. The Carter proposal
appeared to be more expensive than was first suggested and many Con
gressmen found that aspect undesirable.1
Administrative Complexity
Administrative complexity is a major problem of the existing
welfare system and many felt that it was a major problem of Carter’s
PBJI proposal. Even though the cash assistance program would have con
solidated some of the existing programs, wide variations in benefit leyels
and high marginal tax rates would have remained. Moreover, the multitude of
program categories and work requirements would constitute a complex
system. The proposed procedures of retrospective accounting and month
ly income reporting would add to the administrative burden. Others
voiced a concern that the PBJI might well have been too complex for
the welfare administrators, recipients, and the public to understand.2
1Rufas E. Miles, Jr., “The Carter Welfare Reform Plan: An
Administrative Critique” (Princeton, New Jersey, December 1977).
2Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, “Administration’s
Welfare Reform Plan” (New York: Center on Social Welfare Policy and
Law, August 23, 1977), p. 25.
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Adequacy and Equity of Benefit Levels
The benefit levels in the PBJI caused concern because of the
amounts, inequity, and the breadth of coverage. Liberals thought that
$4,200 for a not expected to work family of four was hardly a dignified
standard of living.1 Some conservatives felt the benefits were overly
generous. An additional concern for some liberals was that recipients
on the lower tier of benefits ($2,300 annually for an expected to work
family of four) could not possibly afford the additional expenses of the
job :search required for those who are expected to work.2 A CBO study
estimated that 1.8 million families below the poverty level would lose
benefits under the PBJI. Other inequities inherent in the PBJI in
cluded disparities in benefits from state to state and disparities
among groups such as female headed families with children and individ
uals and couples under 65 receiving much less than those over 65.~
Feasibility of Job Program
Some welfare experts questioned the feasibility of the PBJI’s
job program. That mechanism or strategy would be developed to create
a large number (1.4 million) of public service jobs for the needy popu
lation? In a research paper by Sheldon Danziger, Robert Haveman, and
Eugene Smolensky of the Institute for Research on Poverty, doubts were
raised concerning the feasibility of creating the number of public
service jobs needed for unskilled labor in a relatively short period
1Elliot Currie, “A Piece of Complicated Gimmickry,” The Nation
September 19, 1977, pp. 13-15.
3U.S. Congress, House Committees on Ways and Means, Agriculture,
Education and Labor, Subcommittee on Welfare Reform, 1977, p. 9.
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of time. Furthermore, the PBJI failed to develop a mechanism and/or
strategy that would transplant participants in the job program into
private sector jobs. The PBJI did not focus on developing marketable
skills that would be crucial for the participants of PBJI to
gain private sector jobs.1
Two more areas of concern were the wages to be paid to subsi
dized workers (minimum wage) and the impact of the subsidized workers on
state and local job markets. Labor leaders advocate the use of the pre
vailing wage levels as opposed to minimum wage for the participants of
the PBJI. Labor leaders viewed the use of minimum wage for PBJI par
ticipants as discriminatory and stigmatizing. In addition, labor groups
wanted some type of protection against public and private employers
lowering wages or firing workers because of the PBJI’s job program.2
Fiscal Relief for State and Local Governments
The state and local officials found that the fiscal relief
offered by the PBJI was somewhat less than they had hoped for. One
major criticism was that the PBJI did not provide the immediate fiscal
relief sought by many state and local government officials. The PBJI
provided for gradual relief over a period of time. Others were dis-.
appointed because the PBJI did not provide total federal financing.
An analysis by John P. Keith and Joseph M. Thomas for the Regional
Planning Association stated that the PB.TI failed to adjust benefit
levels in response to inflation. Consequently, the state and local
contribution to basic benefits would rise as the cost of living and
‘James W. Singer, “The Welfare Package - 1.4 Million Jobs, 1.4
Million Questions,” National Journal, November 12, 1977, p. 1764.
2lbid., p. 1770.
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poverty threshold rose. Under these circumstances, states and locali
ties would have realized the greatest fiscal relief the initial year
the proposed programs became effective.1
Ceilings on state marginal tax rates in the PBJI posed problems
for some states. The designers of PBJI, in an effort to be consistent,
provided work incentives for those expected to work and those not ex
pected to work as well as set marginal tax rates for both groups. The
PBJI proposed a 50 percent basic benefit reduction rate. The states
were restricted to a 52 percent benefit reduction rate for those who
could not work. Critics of the PBJI such as the AFL-CIO pointed out
that if you are not expected to work you would not have earned income
and further you would not need any work incentives. Those states with
high benefit levels would be faced with increased welfare rolls. “If
welfare benefits are reduced too rapidly as earnings increase there is
little incentive to work; yet if the benefit reduction rate is too
gradual work incentives remain strong but families remain eligible
until they reach high income levels.”2 For example, if New York main
tained its existing benefit levels, the 52 percent benefit reduction
rate would force it to continue cash aid to working families with in
comes up to $11,923 a year, thus increasing the number of families
3eligible.
1john P. Keith and Joseph M. Thomas, “The Impact of the Carter
Welfare Reform Proposal,” The Journal of the Institute for Socio




Another major issue was the fact that the PBJI did not fold in
health and social service activities. The PBJI included a tax measure
such as EITC and a jobs program but excluded health care and social ser
vices. Many felt that health care and social services were important
areas which should have been integrated with welfare reform. Thus,
some experts suggested that a health insurance package and/or Medicaid
reforms should have accompanied the PBJI. Another perceived shortcoming
of the PBJI was that it made no provisions for the increasing demand for
social services such as child care, that the expanded eligibility of pro
grams will create.’
Though the PBJI offered improvements to the welfare system, it
was perceived as a proposal that did not deal with the trade-offs of
welfare reform effectively. Again, the conflicting nature of the wel
fare reform goals is illustrated in this comprehensive reform approach.
Both the demand side of the labor market approach and the comprehensive
cash assistance approach have practical problems. The guaranteed jobs
approach can affect labor markets and job creation is costly and com
plex. The cash assistance approach needs to define an adequate level of
support and still provide work incentives. A demonstration project
using these approaches might be instructive.
1Martin Hochbaum, “An Analysis of President Carter’s Welfare
Proposals,” Commission on Law, Social Action and Urban Affairs, American
Jewish Congress, New York, October 1977, p. 10.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The current macroeconomic policies and employment programs of
the federal government do not provide an adequate level of income for
all members of the society. The current welfare programs were developed
to bridge this gap. However, these programs are beset with a host of
major problems as outlined in this review. The current welfare pro
grams have failed to meet the fundamental goals sought: Adequacy,
Equity (horizontal and vertical), Effective Work Incentives, Family
Stability Incentives, Administrative Efficiency, and Target Efficiency.
Poverty has persisted despite the current welfare programs.
In terms of adequacy it was found that despite the current wel
fare programs 25 million persons were below the poverty level, about
11.5 percent of the total U.S. population in 1978. Blacks, female-
headed families, families with children, and the aged had a higher than
average incidence of poverty when compared to others. Economic and
social conditions worked together to render the welfare programs less
effective in combating poverty. Occurrences such as the recession of
1973/74 and others in the last decade caused a significant reduction
in the rate of real economic growth. The increased number of
female-headed families in our society in the last decade has produced
an added strain. Female-headed families have a higher incidence of
poverty when compared to other families. In 1977 31.7 percent of all
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female-headed families were in poverty compared to 5.5 percent of other
families.
Low benefit levels have also contributed to the persistence of
poverty. For example, between 1965 and 1975, social security was the
only major cash assistance program whose average benefit level rose con
sistently. Other programs experienced both increases and decreases in
average benefits. The AFDC programs benefits on the average increased
significantly between 1965 and 1970 and then leveled off or declined in
constant dollar terms between 1970 and 1975.
Gaps and leaks in the coverage of the welfare programs also re
duce the programs’ effectiveness in combating poverty. Many experts
point to the categorical nature of the programs as the source of the
problem. Categories used to determine eligibility for the programs
sometimes exclude more needy people than they include. A 1976 study in
dicates that the public assistance category of the major income transfer
programs aided only 5 percent of the poor in getting out of poverty.
The current welfare programs fail to distribute their benefits
equitably. Horizontal inequities (disparities faced by different seg
ments of the poor population) are a pervasive problem. The broad discre
tion left to states leads to widely diverging state standards for bene
fits and coverage. Categorical needs standards allow large segments of
the needy population, especially the working poor, to be excluded from
the federal cash subsidies. Many of the in-kind benefits programs
require participation in categorical programs and can thus exclude the
needy who are not participants. Add to these problems funding limita..
tions and disparities in participation and inequity grows.
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Vertical inequity is also a problem. Vertical inequity focuses
on the advantages the welfare system sometimes provides for the poor
versus the non-poor. A major concern is that the welfare system may
enable welfare recipients to live better than the working poor. For
example, AFDC recipients are allowed to deduct work expenses from their
income and thus are better off than a worker at the same income level
but who is not an AFDC recipient.
Target efficiency is not always realized by the current welfare
programs. Target efficiency is the concept that benefits should be
directed to the most needy. Again, the categorical nature of the pro
gram is a source of inefficiency. Significant portions of the needy
population are excluded. Leaks of benefits to the non-poor and exclu
sion of some portions of the needy population, which include the aged,
families with children, the working poor, and blacks reveal the programs’
inefficiency.
Most welfare experts agree that work incentives are vital if the
welfare system is to achieve its goals. The welfare programs should
avoid causing any negative impact on the welfare recipients’ incentive
to work. Programs like AFDC inserted work incentive provisions in their
structure. Under the AFDC program when recipients’ benefits are calcu
lated the states can deduct work expenses and $30 plus one-third of re
cipients remaining income.
The effort to provide work incentives in the welfare system has
been adversely affected by the cumulative marginal tax rates of the pro
grains. These marginal tax rates have the same effect as regular taxes
on the incentive to work. The higher the tax rates the less the moti
vation to work.
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In many instances, the marginal tax rates of one program are
added to the marginal tax rate of other programs. For example, the in-
kind benefit programs that supplement AFDC have their own marginal tax
rates. Thus, these tax rates combine with the marginal tax rates of the
AFDC program and result in a greater loss in benefits. If an AFDC re
cipient participates in the food stamp program then the recipient is
subject to tax rates of 67 percent under the AFDC program and a 30 per
cent rate for the food stamp program. One study indicated that recipi
ents can average as little as 20 cents per dollar.
Another factor is a series of notches in the benefit scales
that also work against the work incentive provisions. A notch is a
point in the benefit scale where one additional dollar of earnings makes
a recipient ineligible for other programs. Ideally programs have bene
fit levels that gradually decrease to avoid this. However, in some pro
grams like Medicaid an additional dollar of income can cause a family to
be ineligible for $1,000 to $1,500 in medical care.
Most analysts conclude that work disincentives such as cumula
tive marginal tax rates and notches in benefit scales do have a negative
work effect on welfare recipients. Some experts think that the strength
of a negative work effect caused by disincentives is subject to factors
such as age, sex, and marital status. Some researchers have concluded
that the negative work effect is small for working age males but some
what stronger for married women, female family heads, and older men.
The effects of welfare on work are still being evaluated.
The concept of administrative efficiency is the idea that a sys
tem should achieve its goals at a minimum cost. Unfortunately the wel
fare system is characterized by overlapping programs, financial cost-
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liness, and undue complexity. Each program has its own set of rules
and each program is separately administered. Both demographic (cate
groical) and needs-tested standards are used for establishing eligibil
ity and are major causes of the systems’ complexity.
The definition of countable income affects program Costs both
directly by affecting the number of recipients and the amount of bene
fits they receive, and indirectly by necessitating increased administra
tive complexity. In some welfare programs like AFDC, certain expenses
can be deducted from income to achieve increased equity or to provide
financial incentives. Assets tests (includes cash, savings, checking
accounts, cars or homes) establish limits on the amount of assets re
cipients can have and still receive benefits. Various welfare programs
allow different assets to be excluded from the assets tests. This all
adds to the complexity.
An additional problem is that the lines of authority in the wel
fare programs are not clearly established between the federal, state,
and local agencies. States often must try to integrate federal regula
tory changes with on-going state administrative practices. States point
out that there can be a large number of federal changes in a year.
The cost of administration has increased as a result of the
administrative complexity throughout the system. Direct costs of
administration have increased rapidly; consuming about 12 percent of
program costs in both AFDC and food stamps. The indirect cost of
administration has increased because of the number of errors in ad
ministering the programs. -
The growth of expenditures for welfare benefits and coverage has
been the focus of some concern about the dramatic increases in the cost
of the welfare system. Federal income assistance expenditures grew at
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a rate that was two-thirds higher than the rate of growth of the federal
budget between 1965 and 1975. Inflation, expansion of coverage, and
policy changes all contributed to the rapid growth of welfare costs.
Eligibility extensions, new programs, and major revisions of old pro
grams caused significant increases in program costs.
The way in which costs of income assistance programs are dis
tributed has become a burden to state and local governments as the
costs have increased due to inflation and expansion of benefits and
coverage. Most major need based assistance programs require state/local
financial participation. Up to 50 percent of the cost of some programs
is required, and the costs have increased rapidly over recent years.
Thirty-three states finance general assistance programs for needy per
sons who are ineligible for federal assistance.
Goals of adequacy, equity, efficiency are not being met by our
present welfare programs. Waste, error, inequities, inadequacies, and
complexity prevent the recipients and society from obtaining maximum
benefits. The major questions are: (1) should the present system be
revised (an incremental change approach)?, or (2) should the present sys
tem be abolished in lieu of an entirely new one (a comprehensive re
structuring approach)? The alternatives continue to be examined.
The incremental change approach entails step by step modifica
tions of the welfare system to eradicate its problems while retaining
the categorical system of benefits and the federal, state, and local
assumption of administrative obligations. Advocates of this approach
cite these advantages over comprehensive restructuring:
1. Low initial cost
2. More acceptable to the welfare bureaucracy.
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3. Thought to be one of the most realistic approaches.
Critics point out that this approach retains all of the systems’ struc
tural faults.
The comprehensive restructuring approach proposes to replace the
current system with an entirely new one. A number of comprehensive pro
posals have been offered. A work welfare approach, guaranteed job
approach, work condition approach, a multi-track approach, a comprehen
sive cash assistance approach, and a guaranteed income approach. The
proposals would implement new strategies and phase out all or most of
the present systems’ structure. In addition, various approaches can be
used in tandem.
The work-welfare approach makes working a condition for program
participation. Those who are employable would receive assistance in one
of three ways:
1. Work conditioned benefits
2. A guaranteed job program providing public or private sector
employment.
3. Benefits tied to training, educational or employment pro
grams.
Work-welfare has a major goal of providing training and placement ser
vice for participants to enable them to be absorbed into the private
sector. Those who are not employable would receive benefits through
categorical programs or comprehensive cash assistance. The focus is on
the demand side of the labor market.
The objective of the guaranteed jobs program is to provide either
public or private sector jobs to low income families with an employable
member. Employers are encouraged to participate via government exten
sions of tax credits and wage subsidies. Though these types of programs
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have met with some success, there are no provisions for child care or
transportation expenses. In addition, job creation is expensive and
difficult.
Work conditioned benefits programs reward work by providing a
wage subsidy to overall earnings that is tied to the number of hours
worked or by an income tax credit. The focus is on assisting the em
ployable population. Earnings are supplemented, attachment of the poor
to the labor market is strengthened. However, administrative procedures
would be complicated and there is no provision to aid the non-employable.
Benefits would go to the working poor.
The comprehensive cash assistance approach would provide a
single cash system to replace many of the current welfare programs.
The format would be uniform rather than the categorical format of the
current programs. This approach would be more equitable and recipients
could decide how to best meet their needs. However, providing uniform
treatment for all could be unfair and costly.
The guaranteed income approach has been a subject of intense
research and it has gathered some support. This approach requires that
the government provide a minimum level of income for those unable to
work and for those who are unable to earn enough working. A major ob
jective of this approach is to provide a package of effective work in
centives, an adequate level of support and reasonable program costs.
However, welfare experts point out it is impossible to change the levels
of any one of these three without changing the levels of the remaining
factors.
There is much concern over the effect of income guarantees on
work. Economic theory says that the exact result would depend on the
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leisure-income preferences of individuals, the amount of income guaran
tee, and the wage rate available to each individual in question. A
great amount of research and data have been accumulated on the effects
of a guaranteed income. Three major types of research studies have been
used to estimate the effect of welfare reform plans on the poor and near
poor:
1. An analysis of existing welfare programs and an examination
of recipients’ attitudes toward work.
2. Statistical and economic analysis of large quantities of
survey data illustrating the behavior of recipients
called the cross-section approach.
3. A series of direct experiments in which families received
guarantees and their behavior was closely studied.
Though the results varied from study to study, there were some
important findings. The strength of a negative work effect is subject
to factors such as age, sex, and marital status. Males in the New
Jersey Experiment that were prime age and able bodied with family re
sponsibilities were only marginally affected. Secondary earners such
as wives who were most significantly affected could decide to work more
in the home, teenagers could continue their education, and older workers
could take it a bit easier. Thus, the disincentive effect could have
beneficial and socially useful consequences.
The 1977 Carter administration proposal of the Program for
Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) offered much needed reforms such as a na
tional minimum benefit level and expanded coverage. The PBJI was a com
prehensive reform that utilized both comprehensive cash assistance and
a guaranteed jobs program. The focus of this proposal was primarily on
expanded benefits and coverage for many groups and for those who were
employable, a demand side of the labor market via the guaranteed jobs
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program. However, high costs, administrative complexity, and high
levels of work disincentives were seen as PBJI’s shortcomings.
Re conimendati ons
Given that the welfare system has major problems, welfare re
form proposals that attempt to deal with these problems either in an
incremental approach or comprehensive approach should be thoroughly
examined for possible implementation.
The comprehensive restructuring approach offers the greatest
opportunity via alternatives for changing the welfare system. With
the comprehensive approach you could start anew with a coherent system.
However, it is the least feasible politically.
The work-welfare approach focuses on the often neglected demand
side of the labor market, provides an opportunity to work and possibly
gain some skills and thus could be utilized to some advantage. However,
provisions would have to be made for child care and transportation
expenses.
The guaranteed income approach offers a great improvement over
the current system in terms of equity and recipients’ control of bene
fits. This might be compatible with the current “free market” phil
osphy and would decrease administrative costs. A demonstration project
utilizing both could be instructive.
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